

# Mining Security Requirements from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures for Agile Projects

Wentao Wang, Arush Gupta, Nan Niu

QuaRAP'18 Banff, Canada

# Mining Security Requirements from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures

Wentao Wang

QuaRAP

## CVE-2017-15974 Detail

### Current Description

tPanel 2009 allows SQL injection for Authentication Bypass via ' or 1=1 or ''=' to login.php.

**Source:** MITRE

**Description Last Modified:** 10/29/2017

#### Hyperlink


<https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/144444/tPanel-2009-SQL-Injection.html>

<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43085/>

### Technical Details

**Vulnerability Type** ([View All](#))


- SQL Injection ([CWE-89](#))



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University of Cincinnati



Arush Gupta  
Master Student  
University of Cincinnati



Dr. Nan Niu  
Advisor  
University of Cincinnati

# Outline

- **Motivation**
- Approach Details and Research Questions
  - ❖ Retrieve Vulnerabilities as Candidates
  - ❖ Derive Security Acceptance Criterias
  - ❖ Design Test Cases
- Summary



# Butterfly Effect



**Libxml2**

**CVE-2016-4449**

# Butterfly Effect



Libxml2



watchOS


CVE-2016-4449




More than **10**  
companies were affected

Involves more than  
**29** software products

# Vulnerabilities in CVE



# Vulnerabilities in CVE




# Subject Project


**Trust** [Home](#) [Logout](#) [Change Password](#) **Welcome, Kelly Doctor**

- Patient Info
- Appointments
- Office Visit
- Messaging
- Telemedicine
- Add
- Personal Info
- Other

## Notifications


### Message Notification


 5 Appointment requests.

 12 Unread messages.

### Today's Appointments

### Telemedicine Reports

 0 physiological status reports

 0 weight/pedometer status reports

# Requirements Evolution

## UC1 Create and Deactivate Patients Use Case

### 1.1 Preconditions:

The iTrust HCP has authenticated himself or herself in the iTrust Medical Records system (UC3).

### 1.2 Main Flow:

An HCP is able to create a patient [S1] or disable a selected patient [S2]. The create/disable patients and HCP transaction is logged (UC5).

### 1.3 Sub-flows:

- [S1] The HCP enters a patient as a new user of iTrust Medical Records system. Only the name and email are provided. The patient's assigned MID and a secret key (the initial password) are personally provided to the user, with which the user can reset his/her password. The HCP can edit the patient according to [data format 6.4](#) [E1] with all initial values (except patient MID) defaulting to null and/or 0 as appropriate. Patient MID should be the number assigned when the patient is added to the system and cannot be edited. The HCP does not have the ability to enter/edit/view the patient's security question/password.
- [S2] The HCP selects a patient to deactivate. The HCP is presented with a confirmation containing the name of the patient and determines if it is the patient they intend to deactivate [E2]. A deactivated patient can not be modified or log into the system, and can only be reactivated by the administrator.
- [S3] The HCP uploads a comma-separated value file containing one patient per row. The fields of the CSV file must include at least the first name, last name, and e-mail address, with additional columns available for the other demographic values. The patients are created, the tables are populated, and the MIDS and temporary passwords are displayed to the HCP in a table. The event is logged.

### 1.4 Alternative Flows:

- [E1] The system prompts the enterer/editor to correct the format of a required data field because the input of that data field does not match that specified in [data format 6.4](#) for patients.
- [E2] If the confirmation screen does not show the name of the intended patient, the HCP is then prompted to input the correct patient identification information again.
- [E3] If the file is malformed, then no data is added, and an error message explaining the correct file structure is presented.

# Requirements Evolution

UC1 Create and Deactivate Patients Use Case	Ver- sion	Date (mm/dd/yy)	# of Java Methods		# of Req.s Units	
			total	new	total	new
<b>1.1 Preconditions:</b>						
The iTrust HCP has authenticated himself or herself in the iTrust Medical Records system (UC1)	v4	12/12/07	1106	—	92	—
<b>1.2 Main Flow:</b>						
An HCP is able to create a patient [S1] or disable a selected patient [S2]. The create/disable pa	v6	08/23/08	1496	522	128	37
<b>1.3 Sub-flows:</b>						
▪ [S1] The HCP enters a patient as a new user of iTrust Medical Records system. Only the assigned MID and a secret key (the initial password) are personally provided to the user. The HCP can edit the patient according to <a href="#">data format 6.4</a> [E1] with all initial values (exc appropriate. Patient MID should be the number assigned when the patient is added to th have the ability to enter/edit/view the patient's security question/password.	v7	01/15/09	1548	180	140	19
▪ [S2] The HCP selects a patient to deactivate. The HCP is presented with a confirmation it is the patient they intend to deactivate [E2]. A deactivated patient can not be modified by the administrator.	v8	08/17/09	1500	86	153	14
▪ [S3] The HCP uploads a comma-separated value file containing one patient per row. The name, last name, and e-mail address, with additional columns available for the other der tables are populated, and the MIDS and temporary passwords are displayed to the HCP	v9	01/11/10	1636	153	181	20
	v10	08/17/10	1737	103	198	23
	v11	01/17/11	1856	123	287	140
	v12	08/14/11	2135	344	194	48
	v13	01/17/12	2342	202	199	6
	v14	08/16/12	2336	133	203	7
	v15	01/06/13	2378	73	208	5
	v16	08/19/13	2421	72	205	11
<b>1.4 Alternative Flows:</b>						
▪ [E1] The system prompts the enterer/editor to correct the format of a required data field that specified in <a href="#">data format 6.4</a> for patients.	v17	01/09/14	2665	256	211	10
▪ [E2] If the confirmation screen does not show the name of the intended patient, the HCP identification information again.	v18	08/20/14	2849	181	227	16
▪ [E3] If the file is malformed, then no data is added, and an error message explaining the correct file structure is presented.	v19	01/08/15	2946	97	242	15

W. Wang, A. Gupta, Y. Wu, “Continuously Delivered? Periodically Updated? Never Changed? Studying an Open Source Project’s Releases of Code, Requirements, and Trace Matrix”, JITRE, 2015.

# Security requirements in iTrust

## 4. Non-Functional Requirements

### 4.1 HIPAA

Implementation must not violate HIPAA guidelines.

### 4.2 Exclusive Authentication

The system shall enable multiple simultaneous users, each with his/her own exclusive authentication.

### 4.3 Form Validation

The form validation of the system shall show the errors of all the fields in a form at the same time.

### 4.4 Reports

A **report** is a page which opens in a separate window and contains minimal decoration. The format is printer-friendly in that the background is white and the information does not exceed the width of 750 pixels so that upon printing, no information is lost due to the information being too wide.

### 4.5 Privacy Policy

The system shall have a privacy policy linked off of the home page. The privacy policy should follow the template provided [here](#).

### 4.6 Security of MID

Remove MID from being displayed on all pages and URLs. MIDs should be considered private, sensitive information.



# Security requirements in iTrust

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
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
Remove MID from being displayed on all pages and URLs. MIDs should be considered private, sensitive information.

# Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act




J. Cleland-Huang, A. Czauderna, M. Gibiec, J. Emenecker, “A Machine Learning Approach for Tracing Regulatory Codes to Product Specific Requirements”, ICSE, 2010

# Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act



## No documentation or ignore low-level security requirements

W. Behutiye, P. Karhapää, D. Costal, M. Oivo, and X. Franch, “Nonfunctional requirements documentation in agile software development: challenges and solution proposal,” in PROFES, 2017




J. Cleland-Huang, A. Czauderna, M. Gibiec, J. Emenecker, “A Machine Learning Approach for Tracing Regulatory Codes to Product Specific Requirements”, ICSE, 2010

# Outline


- Motivation
- Approach Details and Research Questions
  - ❖ Retrieve Vulnerabilities as Candidates
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# Overview



# Retrieval Vulnerabilities

- Query: UC1 (iTrust)



The image shows a screenshot of a web form titled "Patient Information". The form has a dark header bar with the title in white. Below the header, there are three input fields, each with a label to its left: "First name:", "Last Name:", and "Email:". Each label is followed by a white rectangular input box with a thin border.

# Retrieval Vulnerabilities

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
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### Technical Details

**Vulnerability Type** ([View All](#))

- SQL Injection ([CWE-89](#))

- Query: UC1 (iTrust)



**Patient Information**

First name:

Last Name:

Email:

# Retrieval Vulnerabilities

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### Technical Details

**Vulnerability Type** (View All)

- SQL Injection (CWE-89)

- Query: UC1 (iTrust)
- Latent semantic  
Database : MySQL, SQLI
- LSI

[1] J. H. Hayes, A. Dekhtyar, and J. Osborne, "Improving Requirements Tracing via Information Retrieval," in RE, 2003.



# Derive Security Requirements

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### Technical Details

**Vulnerability Type** ([View All](#))

- SQL Injection ([CWE-89](#))

- Acceptance criteria  
Given-When-Then  
Awareness

# Derive Security Requirements

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Given-When-Then  
Awareness

*ACI:* Given an eligible user, when create patient or upload patients, then all input values shall be properly sanitized to prevent tautology (e.g., 1=1).

# Design Test Cases

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### Technical Details

**Vulnerability Type** ([View All](#))

- SQL Injection ([CWE-89](#))

PatientBean.firstName=" or 1=1"

Patient Information	
First name:	<input type="text" value="or 1=1"/>
Last Name:	<input type="text" value="Smith"/>
Email:	<input type="text" value="a@b.com"/>

*ACI:* Given an eligible user, when create patient or upload patients, then all input values shall be properly sanitized to prevent tautology (e.g., 1=1).

# Potential Improvement

- Step 1: *RQ1: How to improve information retrieval method to achieve the goal of removing irrelevant candidates without filtering our relevant ones?*
- Step 2: *RQ2: Which methods can better classify vulnerabilities to achieve the goal of easily selecting all representative vulnerabilities?*
- Step 3: *RQ3: How to modify attacks in CVE to generate more security test cases which can achieve the goal of increasing testing coverage?*

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# Summary

- Mining security requirements from CVE

Less security related experience is needed when using our approach

- Complementary with existing approaches

Elicitation of security requirements is based on brainstorming, checklists, and analyzing reports of previous failures [1].

[1] J. Cleland-Huang, “Safety stories in agile development,” in IEEE Software, 2017

- Next steps

Research questions

Automation

Evaluations (effectiveness, generalizability)

# Thanks!

